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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
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ACRA Turf Club, LLC (“ACRA”) and Freehold 
Raceway Off Track, LLC (“Freehold”) (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”) filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 
and 1988, against Francesco Zanzuccki (“Zanzuccki”), 
Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission (the “Commission”), asserting that certain 
amendments to New Jersey’s Off-Track and Account 
Wagering Act violate their rights under the United States 
Constitution. The District Court dismissed the case on 
Younger abstention grounds, and Plaintiffs appealed. 
During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. 
Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013), which clarifies and 
reminds courts of the boundaries of the Younger 
abstention doctrine. Because this action does not fit 
within the framework for abstention outlined in Sprint, 
we will reverse. 
I. 
 In an effort to promote horse racing in the State, 
the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Off-Track and 
Account Wagering Act (the “Act”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-
127 et seq., on February 1, 2002, providing for the 
establishment of up to fifteen off-track wagering 
(“OTW”) facilities. The Act authorized the Commission 
to issue a license to a single entity, the New Jersey Sports 
and Exposition Authority (the “NJSEA”), but 
conditioned this grant upon the NJSEA entering into a 
participation agreement with all other entities that held 
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valid permits to conduct horse racing in the year 2000. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:5-130, 5:5-136. Other than the 
NJSEA, ACRA and Freehold were the only two entities 
to qualify as permit holders during the relevant period. 
Thus, on September 8, 2003, the NJSEA, ACRA, and 
Freehold entered into the Master Off-Track Wagering 
Participation Agreement (the “Agreement”), which 
allocated licensing rights for the fifteen OTW facilities as 
follows: NJSEA the right to license nine OTW facilities, 
Freehold the right to license four OTW facilities, and 
ACRA the right to license two OTW facilities. The 
Agreement also provided for geographic exclusivity near 
the participants’ respective racetracks. 
 Although the Act authorized licenses for up to 
fifteen OTW facilities, by 2011, only four facilities had 
opened and were operating, including one by ACRA 
(Favorites at Vineland) and one by Freehold (Favorites at 
Toms River). The NJSEA owned two racetracks 
(Monmouth Park and the Meadowlands), but had leased 
control of those tracks to other entities, one of which was 
the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, 
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Inc. (the “NJTHA”), which currently operates 
thoroughbred racing at both tracks.
1
  
Disappointed by the slow pace at which OTW 
facilities were being opened, the New Jersey Legislature 
passed several amendments to the Act beginning in 2011, 
in an attempt to induce permit holders to open their 
remaining share of OTW facilities allocated by the 
Agreement. On February 23, 2011, the New Jersey 
Legislature enacted the Forfeiture Amendment, 2011 N.J. 
Laws 26, § 4 (amending N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-130(b)(1)), 
which provided that permit holders would forfeit their 
rights to any OTW facility that was not licensed by 
January 1, 2012, unless the permit holder could 
demonstrate that it was “making progress” toward 
obtaining an off-track wagering license and establishing 
an OTW. The Forfeiture Amendment provided further 
that a permit holder’s rights to an OTW facility, if 
forfeited, shall be made available to other “horsemen’s 
organizations” without compensation to the permit 
                                                 
1
  The New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s 
Association is defined in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-129 as 
“the association representing the majority of New Jersey 
thoroughbred owners and trainers responsible for 
receiving and distributing funds for programs designed to 
aid thoroughbred horsemen.” 
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holder.
2
 The NJTHA is one such organization that would 
be entitled to any forfeited rights.  
On January 17, 2012, the New Jersey Legislature 
supplemented the Forfeiture Amendment by passing the 
Deposit Amendment, 2011 N.J. Laws 205, § 4 (amending 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-130(b)(1)). The Deposit 
Amendment extended the forfeiture date to June 28, 
2012, and added a requirement that each permit holder 
make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility in its 
share that is not licensed by December 31, 2011. Id. The 
Deposit Amendment retained the “making progress” 
exception, thus allowing a permit holder to avoid the 
deposit requirement (and forfeiture of rights) if it could 
establish that it was “making progress toward obtaining 
an [OTW] license and establishing an [OTW] facility 
according to specified benchmarks developed by the 
commission.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-130(b)(1). 
On the same date the Deposit Amendment was 
enacted, the New Jersey Legislature also passed the Pilot 
Program Act, 2011 N.J. Laws 228 (codified at N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 5:5-186), which directed the Commission to 
                                                 
2
  A “horsemen’s organization” is defined by the 
Simulcasting Racing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-110 et 
seq., as an “organization or group representing a majority 
of horsemen engaged in competing for purses during a 
regularly scheduled horse race meeting, as the case may 
be.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-111. 
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establish a three-year Pilot Program for the installation of 
electronic wagering terminals in a limited number of bars 
and restaurants. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-186. Participation 
in the Pilot Program was limited to lessees or purchasers 
of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who were permitted to 
exchange any unused OTW licenses for a license to 
install electronic wagering terminals. The NJTHA 
secured the right to a Pilot Program license by paying $2 
million to the other assignee of NJSEA’s licenses, the 
New Meadowlands Racetrack, LLC.  
On January 30, 2012, the Commission sent letters 
to ACRA, Freehold, and other OTW licensees, detailing 
the Forfeiture and Deposit Amendments and notifying 
each permit holder that it could extend its rights to 
establish licensed OTW facilities either by posting a 
deposit or demonstrating to the satisfaction of the 
Commission that the permit holder had made progress 
toward establishing its share of OTW facilities. On 
March 29, 2012, ACRA and Freehold submitted petitions 
to the Commission (the “Progress Petitions”), seeking to 
demonstrate that they were making progress toward 
opening their remaining OTW facilities. In their 
respective petitions, ACRA and Freehold also challenged 
the constitutionality of the amendments under the 
Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States Constitution. 
On May 9, 2012, while their petitions were 
pending before the Commission, Plaintiffs filed the 
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instant suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, seeking to enjoin enforcement of 
the three amendments based on the same constitutional 
challenges set out in the Progress Petitions. Plaintiffs 
then filed a motion for preliminary injunction on May 24, 
2012, claiming they faced irreparable harm if the state 
review process was allowed to proceed. Zanzuccki 
opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that abstention 
was warranted under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971). 
While the preliminary injunction motion was 
pending before the District Court, the Commission held a 
meeting on June 20, 2012, to consider whether Plaintiffs 
had made progress toward establishing their share of 
OTW facilities. The Commission determined that both 
ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward 
establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities, absolved 
them of the obligation to submit deposits, and directed 
them to “comply with the requirements of the statute and 
continue to make progress on an annual basis.” App. 
320–21. Following the Commission’s decision, 
Zanzuccki filed a letter with the District Court arguing 
that the Commission’s decision eliminated any 
irreparable harm that would previously have resulted 
from denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. On 
July 11, 2012, the District Court denied Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice, 
finding that there was no immediate, irreparable harm 
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“since deposit or forfeiture is at least a year away.” App. 
34. 
As one of the entities that would have been entitled 
to licensing rights forfeited by ACRA or Freehold, the 
NJTHA was not satisfied with the Commission’s 
decision that Plaintiffs had made sufficient progress in 
establishing their remaining unlicensed OTW facilities. 
Thus, on July 11, 2012, the NJTHA filed an appeal with 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division (the 
“Making Progress Appeal”), contesting the 
Commission’s determination. ACRA and Freehold 
10 
 
subsequently joined the Making Progress Appeal as co-
respondents of the Commission.
3
 
With the Making Progress Appeal pending before 
the New Jersey Appellate Division, Plaintiffs filed a 
motion for summary judgment in their federal action on 
October 12, 2012, seeking a judgment declaring that the 
Amendments were unconstitutional. Zanzuccki filed an 
                                                 
3
  On July 27, 2012, shortly after filing the Making 
Progress Appeal, the NJTHA—along with the 
Standardbred Breeders and Owners Association, who 
filed its own motion on August 7, 2012—filed a motion 
to intervene in Plaintiffs’ federal suit and to dismiss 
based, in part, on Younger abstention. The Magistrate 
Judge struck as premature the part of the motion that 
sought to dismiss the Complaint, and the NJTHA filed an 
appeal of that order, which we dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. The District Court subsequently denied the 
motion to intervene on February 27, 2013, finding that 
the proposed intervenors failed to demonstrate that their 
interests were not adequately represented by Zanzuccki. 
The NJTHA filed a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2013, 
which was docketed as No. 13-1634 (the “Intervention 
Appeal”) and consolidated with this appeal for purposes 
of disposition only. We resolve the Intervention Appeal 
in a separate opinion issued concurrently with this 
decision. 
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opposition as well as a cross-motion for dismissal of the 
complaint based on Younger abstention. Specifically, 
Zanzuccki argued that the Making Progress Appeal 
provided an adequate opportunity for ACRA and 
Freehold to raise their constitutional challenges in state 
court.  
On May 30, 2013, the District Court issued an 
Order and Memorandum Opinion granting Zanzuccki’s 
cross-motion to dismiss the complaint on Younger 
abstention grounds. In reaching its conclusion, the 
District Court applied the three-part test articulated in 
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar 
Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), which requires 
(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) which 
implicates important state interests; and (3) offers an 
adequate opportunity to raise the same constitutional 
challenges presented in the federal action. Finding these 
requirements satisfied, the District Court applied Younger 
abstention and dismissed the complaint.  
Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because it arises 
following a final order of dismissal.  
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 “We exercise plenary review over whether the 
requirements for abstention have been met.” Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
 While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. 
Ct. 584 (2013), reiterating that Younger abstention is 
appropriate in only three narrow categories of cases. 
Although Sprint provides a much needed framework for 
evaluating abstention issues, the Court explained that 
Sprint was merely a restatement of the abstention 
principles found in the Court’s existing precedent. 
Accordingly, our analysis must consider the full body of 
abstention case law, beginning with Younger itself. 
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971), 
the Supreme Court held that federal courts should decline 
to enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution 
absent a showing that the charges had been brought in 
bad faith or with an intent to harass. The plaintiff in 
Younger was indicted in state court for distributing 
leaflets in violation of the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act, and he sought a federal court injunction 
against the state criminal prosecution on the grounds that 
the Act and the charges brought under it violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court 
agreed with the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that federal courts should not interfere with state 
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criminal proceedings, “particularly . . . when the moving 
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer 
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Younger, 
401 U.S. at 43–44. The Court explained that this decision 
was founded on “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is a proper 
respect for state functions.” Id. at 44. The result was a 
rule that state criminal proceedings should be enjoined 
only in “extraordinary circumstances, where the danger 
of irreparable loss is both great and immediate” and it 
“plainly appears that [asserting the constitutional defense 
in state court] would not afford adequate protection.” Id. 
at 45 (citations omitted). 
Although Younger was initially developed as a 
limitation on the ability of federal courts to interfere with 
pending state criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court 
has since extended Younger’s application to bar federal 
interference with certain state civil and administrative 
proceedings. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 
(1975), was the groundbreaking decision which extended 
Younger into the civil arena. In Huffman, state officials 
instituted a civil nuisance proceeding and successfully 
obtained a judgment against an adult movie theater for 
violating an Ohio statute declaring the exhibition of 
obscene films to be a nuisance. Instead of appealing the 
decision within the state court system, the theater 
company filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The Supreme Court held that abstention was the proper 
course, emphasizing that the state’s nuisance proceeding 
14 
 
was “more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most 
civil cases.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604. The Court noted 
that the state was a party to the civil nuisance proceeding, 
which was “both in aid of and closely related to criminal 
statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene 
materials.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
“State’s interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be 
every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal 
proceeding.”4 Id. 
 The Court revisited the Younger abstention 
doctrine two years later with its decision in Trainor v. 
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). In Trainor, the Illinois 
Department of Public Aid instituted a civil fraud 
proceeding in state court to recover welfare benefits 
obtained by Hernandez and his wife, who had allegedly 
concealed their personal assets when applying for public 
                                                 
4
  Three justices dissented, arguing that, because civil 
proceedings can be initiated simply by filing a complaint, 
it is too easy for the state to “strip [someone] of a forum 
and a remedy that federal statutes were enacted to 
assure.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 615 
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although recognizing 
that Huffman was limited to quasi-criminal proceedings, 
Justice Brennan expressed his concern that the majority’s 
decision was “obviously only the first step” toward 
applying Younger abstention to all civil cases in state 
court. Id. at 613. 
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assistance. After the department obtained a writ of 
attachment pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act 
against the defendant’s savings account, Hernandez 
brought a federal action challenging the constitutionality 
of the attachment statute and seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court again held that 
abstention was appropriate even though the proceeding 
was wholly civil. The Court emphasized that “the State 
was a party to the suit in its role of administering its 
public-assistance programs” and, by pursuing the action, 
was “vindicat[ing] important state policies such as 
safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those programs.” Id. 
at 444. As in Huffman, the Court pointed out that the 
state could have vindicated the same interests by 
initiating a criminal enforcement action. Id. The Court 
concluded that “the principles of Younger and Huffman 
are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal 
court with an ongoing civil enforcement action such as 
this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
It was not long before the Court considered 
Younger’s application again in Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 
415 (1979). In Moore, the Texas Department of Human 
Resources (the “DHR”) acted pursuant to an emergency 
ex parte order to remove children from their home based 
on suspicions of child abuse. The parents filed suit in 
federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 
Texas law authorizing the DHR’s actions, and a three-
16 
 
judge district court held that the law was 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that the district court should have abstained 
and dismissed the case. The Court explained that its prior 
cases demonstrated that the policy concerns articulated in 
Younger are “fully applicable to civil proceedings in 
which important state interests are involved.” Id. at 423. 
Once again, the Court acknowledged that, like the 
nuisance proceeding in Huffman, the temporary removal 
of a child based on suspicions of child abuse is “in aid of 
and closely related to criminal statutes.” Id. (quoting 
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). The Court then considered 
“whether [the parents’] constitutional claims could have 
been raised in the pending state proceedings,” explaining 
that “abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly 
bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Id. at 
425–26. Because Texas law did not present any 
procedural barriers to the presentation of the parents’ 
constitutional claims, the Court concluded that abstention 
was warranted. Id. at 432.  
By the time Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. 
Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), was 
decided, the Supreme Court had already applied Younger 
abstention when confronted with a variety of ongoing 
state court civil proceedings. Middlesex, however, 
marked the first time the Court invoked the abstention 
doctrine in favor of a state administrative proceeding. 
The plaintiff in Middlesex, a lawyer, filed a suit in federal 
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court seeking to enjoin as unconstitutional ongoing 
investigations and administrative proceedings by the 
New Jersey state bar ethics committee. Agreeing with the 
district court’s decision to abstain, the Supreme Court 
explained that “[t]he policies underlying Younger are 
fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when 
important state interests are involved,” id. at 432, which 
may be “demonstrated by the fact that the noncriminal 
proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings 
criminal in nature.” Id. (citing Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). 
Where such “vital state interests” are found, the Court 
proclaimed, “a federal court should abstain ‘unless state 
law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional 
claims.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 442 U.S. at 426). The 
Court then set out a three-part inquiry to guide its 
analysis: 
first, do state bar disciplinary hearings . . . 
constitute an ongoing state judicial 
proceeding; second, do the proceedings 
implicate important state interests; and third, 
is there an adequate opportunity in the state 
proceedings to raise constitutional 
challenges.  
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Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). Finding this three-part 
test satisfied,
5
 the Court abstained.
6
 Id. at 437. 
 A few years later, in Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 
619 (1986), the Supreme Court, for the second time, 
found Younger abstention was appropriate in view of an 
ongoing state administrative proceeding. In Dayton, a 
pregnant teacher at a church-run school filed a complaint 
with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission after the school 
had refused to renew her contract because of its official 
view that mothers should stay home with their preschool 
                                                 
5
  As to the third prong, the Court acknowledged that 
the state ethics committee had concluded its evaluation 
without considering the plaintiff’s constitutional 
arguments. Nonetheless, the Court found that the plaintiff 
had an adequate opportunity to present those challenges 
to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which had appellate 
jurisdiction over the ethics committee’s decision. 
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435–36. 
6
  Justice Brennan concurred in the decision and 
noted that despite his general view that Younger is 
inapplicable to civil proceedings, he was inclined to join 
the judgment of the majority in light of the “quasi-
criminal nature of bar disciplinary proceedings.” 
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
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children. The Commission concluded that there was 
probable cause to conclude that the school’s conduct 
amounted to impermissible sex discrimination and, 
accordingly, initiated administrative proceedings against 
the school. The school defended the administrative 
proceeding by asserting a defense under the First 
Amendment and also filed suit in federal court to enjoin 
the administrative action. The Supreme Court, once 
again, held that abstention was proper. Although it did 
not directly apply the three-part Middlesex test, the Court 
proceeded along similar lines by first emphasizing that 
the administrative proceeding was “judicial in nature” 
from its outset. Dayton, 477 U.S. at 627. The Court 
reiterated that Younger principles apply when there are 
state proceedings “in which important state interests are 
vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings 
the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim.” Id. The 
Court concluded that the state’s interest in eliminating 
gender discrimination was important, and that the 
availability of state judicial review ensured an adequate 
opportunity to raise constitutional issues. Id. at 628–29. 
 The most recent pre-Sprint abstention case is New 
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New 
Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350 (1989). There, for the 
first time in nearly two decades, the Supreme Court 
scaled back Younger’s expanding reach and declined to 
abstain in favor of a state proceeding. In NOPSI, a utility 
20 
 
company sought a rate increase from the New Orleans 
City Council to recover costs imposed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission. The Council denied the 
rate increase and then filed a declaratory judgment action 
in state court to confirm the validity of its order. The 
utility company contested the state action and also 
initiated a suit in federal court challenging the 
constitutionality of the Council’s decision. The district 
court abstained, based in part on Younger, and the court 
of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and 
declared that federal court abstention is not warranted in 
all instances where there are pending state court 
proceedings. The Court stated: 
Although our concern for comity and 
federalism has led us to expand the 
protection of Younger beyond state criminal 
prosecutions, to civil enforcement 
proceedings, and even to civil proceedings 
involving certain orders that are uniquely in 
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 
perform their judicial functions, it has never 
been suggested that Younger requires 
abstention in deference to a state judicial 
proceeding reviewing legislative or 
executive action. Such a broad abstention 
requirement would make a mockery of the 
rule that only exceptional circumstances 
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justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a 
case in deference to the States. 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 367–68 (citations omitted). The 
Court ultimately concluded that the Council’s rate setting 
was essentially a legislative task and that Younger had 
never been applied to prevent review of such matters. 
The Court acknowledged that its decision would likely 
preclude the state court from deciding the issue, but held 
that this possibility did not compel abstention, noting that 
“there is no doctrine that the availability or even the 
pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the 
federal courts.” Id. at 373. 
IV. 
 More than two decades passed between NOPSI 
and Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 
(2013). During that period, district courts demonstrated 
greater and greater willingness to abstain from 
adjudicating federal claims in deference to ongoing state 
proceedings. See Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger 
Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 
12 Nev. L.J. 1, 9 n.62 (2011) (discussing empirical 
finding that, between 1995 and 2006, a party seeking 
abstention under Younger was successful 51.6 percent of 
the time). When analyzing abstention questions during 
this twenty-four year period, most courts strictly and 
mechanically applied the three-part test from Middlesex, 
while largely ignoring the limitations imposed by NOPSI. 
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Id. at 8–9. That approach commonly resulted in 
abstention because “the three Middlesex factors have 
been expanded so broadly that most parallel state 
criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement or similar 
actions will satisfy them.” Id. at 9. Perhaps recognizing 
this tendency of federal courts to decline to adjudicate 
federal claims, the Court in Sprint rejected the notion that 
Younger abstention is the rule rather than the exception.
7
 
The Court declared that Younger is an “exceptional” 
remedy to be invoked in only a narrow range of cases. 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 588.  
Sprint involved a dispute between two 
telecommunication service providers, Sprint (a national 
provider) and Windstream (an Iowa communications 
company). Sprint had long paid intercarrier access fees to 
Windstream for long distance calls placed by Sprint 
customers to Windstream’s in-state customers. In 2009, 
however, Sprint began withholding payment for a subset 
                                                 
7
  A review of Third Circuit precedent reveals that 
our Court was not excepted from the pitfall of 
mechanically applying the Middlesex factors as a stand-
alone test. However, because our decision today requires 
a straightforward application of Sprint, and because 
neither party has asked us to reconsider prior Third 
Circuit decisional law, we do not address the extent to 
which our holding disrupts our Court’s pre-Sprint 
precedential authority. 
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of those calls, classified as Voice over Internet Protocol 
(“VoIP”), based on its interpretation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The dispute eventually 
ended up in an administrative proceeding before the Iowa 
Utilities Board (the “IUB”), which rejected Sprint’s 
interpretation of the federal statute and held that 
intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls. 
Seeking to overturn the IUB ruling, Sprint 
commenced two lawsuits. First, it filed suit in federal 
court seeking a declaration that the Telecommunications 
Act preempted the IUB’s decision. Sprint also appealed 
the IUB’s decision to the Iowa state courts, which Sprint 
explained was simply a protective measure because of 
Eighth Circuit precedent requiring exhaustion of state 
remedies before litigating in federal court. On motion by 
the IUB, the district court dismissed Sprint’s federal suit 
on Younger abstention grounds. The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, based in large part on the three-part Middlesex 
test.  
In reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
as a “general rule . . . ‘the pendency of an action in [a] 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same 
matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.’” Sprint, 
134 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976)) (alteration omitted). The Court reiterated that 
“[p]arallel state-court proceedings do not detract from” a 
federal court’s “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear 
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and decide a case. Id. at 591 (quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817). 
  The Court then reiterated the limitations on the 
abstention doctrine set out in NOPSI, explaining that 
Younger can overcome the general principle that federal 
courts must hear and decide cases only in “exceptional” 
circumstances, where “the prospect of undue interference 
with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.” 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 
368). These “exceptional” circumstances arise only 
where the federal action interferes with one of three 
categories of cases: (1) “ongoing state criminal 
prosecutions” (as in Younger itself); (2) “certain civil 
enforcement proceedings” (such as the nuisance action in 
Huffman); and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain 
orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ 
ability to perform their judicial functions” (such as state 
court civil contempt proceedings).
8
 Id. at 591 (internal 
                                                 
8
  Two Supreme Court cases implicate this third 
category subject to Younger abstention. See Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 & n.12 (1977) (civil contempt 
order); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 
(1987) (requirement for the posting of bond pending 
appeal). Because this is a unique breed of Younger 
abstention which is not relevant to this appeal, we do not 
provide a detailed discussion of these cases here. 
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quotation marks and citations omitted).  These categories, 
said the Court, “define Younger’s scope.” Id. 
After noting that the first and third categories 
plainly did not accommodate the IUB proceeding, the 
Court turned to consider whether the proceeding was a 
“civil enforcement proceeding” of the type to which 
Younger applied. Id. at 592. The Court explained that 
cases applying Younger in the context of civil 
enforcement proceedings generally involve state 
proceedings that are “akin to a criminal prosecution in 
important respects.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Such actions, the Court noted, “are 
characteristically initiated to sanction the federal 
plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, for 
some wrongful act.” Id. (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 
433–34). Additionally, “a state actor is routinely a party 
to the state proceeding and often initiates the action.” Id. 
(citing Dayton, 477 U.S. at 619; Moore, 442 U.S. at 419–
20; Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598). 
Finally, the Court stated that “[i]nvestigations are 
commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a 
formal complaint or charges.” Id. (citing Dayton, 477 
U.S. at 624; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433). Applying this 
framework, the Court concluded that the IUB proceeding 
was not the type of civil enforcement proceeding to 
which Younger applies. The Court explained: 
It is not “akin to a criminal prosecution.” 
Nor was it initiated by “the State in its 
26 
 
sovereign capacity.” A private corporation, 
Sprint, initiated the action. No state 
authority conducted an investigation into 
Sprint’s activities, and no state actor lodged 
a formal complaint against Sprint. 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (citations omitted).  
The Court then addressed the Eighth Circuit’s 
heavy reliance on the three-part Middlesex test. Recalling 
the facts from Middlesex (a lawyer’s attempt to enjoin an 
investigation and administrative proceedings by a state 
bar ethics committee), the Court stated that Middlesex fit 
neatly within the second category of Younger cases 
because it was “indeed ‘akin to a criminal proceeding.’” 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593. Acknowledging that lower 
courts were inappropriately treating the three Middlesex 
factors as a stand-alone test, the Court clarified that 
“[t]he three Middlesex conditions . . . were not 
dispositive,” but “were, instead, additional factors 
appropriately considered by the federal court before 
invoking Younger.” Id. (first emphasis added). The Court 
explained: 
Divorced from their quasi-criminal context, 
the three Middlesex conditions would extend 
Younger to virtually all parallel state and 
federal proceedings, at least where a party 
could identify a plausibly important state 
interest. That result is irreconcilable with 
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our dominant instruction that, even in the 
presence of parallel state proceedings, 
abstention from the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction is the “exception, not the rule.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
V. 
 Although pre-Sprint case law provides significant 
guidance in deciding this case, Sprint itself supplies the 
framework for our analysis. Sprint offers a forceful 
reminder of the longstanding principle that federal courts 
have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear and 
decide cases within their jurisdiction. Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 
591 (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817); see also 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“We have 
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). 
Abstention under the Younger line of cases overcomes 
this principle only when federal litigation threatens to 
interfere with one of three classes of cases: (1) state 
criminal prosecutions, (2) state civil enforcement 
proceedings, and (3) state civil proceedings involving 
orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function. 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591. As in Sprint, this case does not 
fit within the first or third categories. We, therefore, must 
consider whether the state proceeding, including the 
Making Progress Appeal currently pending before the 
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Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court,
9
 is 
the type of “exceptional” civil enforcement proceeding 
from which Younger would compel abstention. Sprint, 
134 S. Ct. at 588. We conclude it is not.  
 After Sprint, the threshold requirement for 
applying Younger abstention is that the state civil 
enforcement proceeding must be “quasi-criminal” in 
nature. Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593; see also id. at 592 
(stating that Younger generally applies only when the 
state proceeding is “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in 
‘important respects’”). In evaluating whether a state 
proceeding is quasi-criminal, we consider the factors set 
out in Sprint, including whether (1) the action was 
                                                 
9
  Although the Commission’s review of the Progress 
Petitions and the Making Progress Appeal could be 
viewed as two different proceedings, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly assumed, without deciding, that an 
administrative proceeding and the state court’s review are 
part of a single “unitary process.” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 
592 (“We will assume without deciding, as the Court did 
in NOPSI, that an administrative adjudication and the 
subsequent state court’s review of it count as a ‘unitary 
process’ for Younger purposes.”). We follow this 
approach and assume, for purposes of this opinion, that 
the Commission’s review of the Progress Petitions and 
the Making Progress Appeal are both components of a 
single state proceeding. 
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commenced by the State in its sovereign capacity, (2) the 
proceeding was initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff 
for some wrongful act, and (3) there are other similarities 
to criminal actions, such as a preliminary investigation 
that culminated with the filing of formal charges. Id. at 
592. We also consider whether the State could have 
alternatively sought to enforce a parallel criminal statute. 
See, e.g., Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604 (describing the civil 
nuisance action as “closely related to criminal statutes 
which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials”); 
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444 (pointing out that “[t]he state 
authorities also had the option of vindicating these 
policies through criminal prosecutions”). 
 The state proceeding at issue in this appeal does 
not bear any of the hallmarks that Sprint and its 
predecessors identify with quasi-criminal actions. It was 
not initiated by the State in its sovereign capacity, a point 
which is illuminated by the fact that no state actor 
conducted an investigation or filed any type of formal 
complaint or charges. Instead, the state proceeding was 
initiated by Plaintiffs (private entities) when they 
voluntarily submitted their Progress Petitions to the 
Commission for review. There is also no evidence that 
the state proceeding was commenced to sanction 
Plaintiffs for some wrongful act. Rather, the requirements 
imposed by the Forfeiture and Deposit Amendments 
were plainly intended to incentivize conduct which the 
State believed would be economically beneficial. Finally, 
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there is no indication that the policies implicated in the 
state proceeding could have been vindicated through 
enforcement of a parallel criminal statute. Because 
nothing here suggests the state proceeding is any “more 
akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases,” 
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, we conclude that the District 
Court’s decision to abstain was incorrect.  
 Zanzuccki challenges the contention that the state 
proceeding is not quasi-criminal. In particular, he asserts 
that the State initiated the proceeding in its sovereign 
capacity.
10
 He argues that the Commission, a state actor, 
commenced the proceeding “on January 30, 2012, when 
[it] sent a letter to [Plaintiffs] advising that they could 
extend their rights to unlicensed OTW facilities either by 
posting a deposit or by demonstrating in a petition, to the 
satisfaction of the Racing Commission, that they had 
                                                 
10
  After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Sprint, the Court sent a notice to the parties requesting 
supplemental briefing on Sprint’s application to this 
appeal. In response to the Court’s inquiry, Zanzuccki 
initially conceded that he “cannot . . . describe the [state] 
civil enforcement proceeding as ‘akin to a criminal 
prosecution.’” Zanzuccki’s Dec. 26, 2013 Ltr. Br. at 3. At 
oral argument, however, Zanzuccki retreated from that 
position and argued that the state proceeding sufficiently 
resembled the type of enforcement actions Sprint 
suggests are subject to Younger abstention.  
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made progress toward establishing their share of the 
remaining OTWs.” Zanzuccki’s Dec. 26, 2013 Ltr. Br. at 
3. We disagree.
11
 
 We fail to see how the Commission’s January 30, 
2012 letter represents an effort by the State to initiate any 
type of civil proceeding against Plaintiffs. The letter was 
a purely informational document intended to inform 
Plaintiffs of the requirements imposed by the newly-
enacted Amendments. Indeed, it did not provide any 
                                                 
11
  Judge Shwartz would find that this letter was more 
than informational and would be sufficient to constitute 
the initiation of a proceeding by a state actor, particularly 
because it provided the avenue for the licensees to seek 
relief from the Forfeiture and Deposit Amendments and 
it made clear that a lack of response would result in a 
revocation of the licensing rights or the requirement to 
pay a $1 million deposit for each unopened facility. As a 
result, Judge Shwartz has a different view of the January 
30, 2012 letter and would not rule out the use of a letter 
as a means to initiate a proceeding to which Younger 
applies. Although we hold the Commission’s January 30, 
2012 letter does not represent an attempt by the State to 
initiate civil enforcement proceedings against Plaintiffs, 
we express no opinion as to whether some method other 
than the Commission’s letter could constitute a state’s 
initiation of such proceedings as described by the 
Supreme Court in Sprint. 
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information other than to describe the contents of the 
statute, a fact that is demonstrated by the letter’s 
concluding paragraph, which states: 
Please be advised that the Commission is 
requesting that any permit holder which 
intends to seek an extension pursuant to the 
circumstances in [the Deposit Amendment] 
shall file a petition with the [C]ommission 
no later than March 31, 2012 . . . . 
Compliance with this filing deadline will 
allow the [C]ommission time to evaluate the 
petition and make a determination prior to 
[the deposit deadline]. Should you have any 
questions, please feel free to contact me. 
App. 165. Both the tone and the obvious purpose of the 
letter are clear from this excerpt. Nothing about the letter 
reflects an effort by the Commission to initiate adverse, 
quasi-criminal proceedings. Significantly, the 
Commission’s letter did not demand any action by 
ACRA or Freehold, but rather simply “advise[s]” them 
about changes in the law. Id.  
 Moreover, the Commission’s letter in no way 
resembles the initiation procedures employed by state 
actors in cases where the Supreme Court has applied 
Younger abstention. Indeed, all of those cases involved a 
state entity that commenced civil or administrative 
proceedings by filing some type of formal complaint or 
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charges. See, e.g., Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598 (“[The state 
actor] instituted a nuisance proceeding in the Court of 
Common Pleas . . . .”); Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435 (“The 
Illinois Department of Public Aid . . . filed a lawsuit in 
the Circuit Court of Cook County . . . .”); Moore, 442 
U.S. at 419 (“[T]he Department . . . institute[d] a suit for 
emergency protection of the children under . . . the Texas 
Family Code.”); Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 428 (“The 
Committee then served a formal statement of charges on 
[the federal plaintiff].”); Dayton, 477 U.S. at 624 (“[T]he 
Commission initiated administrative proceedings against 
[the school] by filing a complaint.”). To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has not directly held that Younger applies 
only when a state actor files a complaint or formal 
charges. Nonetheless, its Younger progeny suggest that a 
state’s “initiation” procedure must proceed with greater 
formality than merely sending a targeted advisory notice 
to a class of people that may be affected by new 
legislation. 
 We likewise reject Zanzuccki’s contention that the 
state proceeding threatened the imposition of sanctions if 
Plaintiffs failed to “make progress” toward establishing 
their remaining OTW facilities. Zanzuccki argues that we 
should analogize the Commission’s authority to revoke 
Plaintiffs’ licensing rights and/or require Plaintiffs to post 
a $1 million deposit for each unopened facility to the 
type of sanctions found in a quasi-criminal proceeding. 
We do not agree.  
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 There is no dispute that ACRA and Freehold 
would have faced undesirable consequences—in the way 
of potential forfeiture of rights or a substantial deposit 
requirement—if they had failed to show they were 
“making progress” toward licensing their remaining 
OTW facilities. But negative consequences are not the 
same thing as sanctions. Sanctions are retributive in 
nature and are typically imposed to punish the sanctioned 
party “for some wrongful act.” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592. 
No party here suggests that Plaintiffs’ conduct (or 
inaction) in failing to establish its OTW facilities was 
unlawful, much less “wrongful.” In fact, Zanzuccki 
admits that punishment was not the goal, explaining that 
“the amendments to the Off-Track and Account 
Wagering Act . . . were designed to incentivize the 
Appellants to open their remaining OTWs.” Zanzuccki’s 
Dec. 26, 2013 Ltr. Br. at 3 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, even if Plaintiffs had not prevailed on their 
Progress Petitions, they still would not have been legally 
obligated to make the $1 million deposit. At that point, 
making the deposit would simply have been a cost of 
doing business, with the choice of whether to make such 
payment resting entirely with Plaintiffs.  
 Our review of Supreme Court cases applying 
Younger highlights why the deposit requirement and 
potential forfeiture of rights at issue here are not 
comparable to “sanctions” found in quasi-criminal 
proceedings. For example, in Huffman, the state filed a 
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complaint against a theater company for violating the 
obscenity provisions of a nuisance statute, and it sought 
to sanction the theater by forcing its closure and seizing 
and selling its personal property. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 
598. Huffman undoubtedly involved a state civil 
enforcement action that was initiated to sanction the 
federal plaintiff for what the state considered wrongful 
conduct. The state proceeding in Trainor—a civil action 
to recover welfare benefits fraudulently obtained by the 
defendant—likewise involved an attempt by the state to 
sanction an individual for his wrongful conduct. 431 U.S. 
at 435–36. So, too, did Middlesex, where a lawyer was 
investigated for and charged with acting in a manner 
“prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 457 U.S. at 
428. If the charges against him were confirmed, he would 
have been subject to disbarment. Id. at 427. And finally, 
in Dayton, an administrative proceeding was initiated 
following an investigation that revealed a private school 
had engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. 477 
U.S. at 624. If the charges were substantiated, the school 
would have been required to reinstate the plaintiff with 
back pay and would have become subject to “continuing 
surveillance” by the state. Dayton, 477 U.S. at 632 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  
Dating back to Huffman, each of these cases 
clearly involved civil enforcement proceedings that were 
“initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff . . . for some 
wrongful act.” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592. In contrast, as 
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we have pointed out here, the New Jersey legislature and 
the Commission were merely attempting to induce 
ACRA and Freehold to exercise licensing rights for 
which Plaintiffs had lawful ownership. Like tax increases 
and new regulatory obligations, the deposit requirement 
and potential forfeiture of rights may have been 
unwelcome changes in the law for ACRA and Freehold. 
They are not, however, the equivalent of sanctions found 
in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings.  
After examining the state proceeding at issue in 
this appeal, we can identify none of the quasi-criminal 
characteristics discussed in Sprint and found in the 
Court’s past Younger abstention cases. Even accepting, 
for purposes of this appeal, that the state proceeding is a 
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“civil enforcement” action,12 we conclude it is not the 
type of proceeding entitled to Younger deference because 
it is no “more akin to a criminal prosecution than are 
most civil cases.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
                                                 
12
  Although we hold that the state proceeding is not 
entitled to Younger deference because it is not “akin to a 
criminal prosecution,” we are skeptical that the state 
proceeding even fits within the “civil enforcement” 
category to begin with. In NOPSI, the Court emphasized 
that “it has never been suggested that Younger requires 
abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding 
reviewing legislative or executive action.” NOPSI, 491 
U.S. at 368 (emphasis added). The Commission’s review 
of the Progress Petitions was arguably nothing more than 
an executive action, and the Making Progress Appeal 
could be viewed as a judicial review of such executive 
action. If this is true, the District Court’s decision to 
abstain was plainly inappropriate under NOPSI. Yet, the 
record does not permit us to determine whether the 
Commission’s review should be characterized as 
executive action or as an “administrative proceeding[] 
[that was] ‘judicial in nature’ from the outset.” Dayton, 
477 U.S. at 627 (discussing Middlesex). Accordingly, we 
do not address this issue further. 
